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The Mind’s ‘I’ in Meditation: Early Pāi Buddhadhamma 
and Transcendental Phenomenology in Mutual Refl ection
Khristos Nizamis1
Introduction
This essay provides a condensed introductory ‘snapshot’ of just a few of the many and 
profound correlations existing between early (pre-Abhidhamma) P
i Buddhism and Transcendental 
Phenomenology, by focusing on what is arguably the most central and essential ‘philosophical 
problem’ in both traditions: the true nature and signi cance of the ‘I’ of subjective intentional 
consciousness.  It argues that the Buddhist axiom of ‘not-self’ (anatt) is by no means incompatible 
with the fundamental phenomenological irreducibility, and necessity, of transcendental subjectivity 
– or, as Husserl also puts it, of the ‘pure’ or ‘transcendental ‘I’’ – a structure evidently essential to 
intentional consciousness as ‘consciousness-of’.  On the one hand, Husserl recognises (and struggles 
with) the peculiar ‘emptiness’ of the ‘pure ‘I’’.  On the other hand, a fundamental distinction must 
clearly be drawn between genuine intentional subjectivity – which even Buddhas and Arahants must 
of necessity possess – and the erroneous bases upon which the concept of ‘self’ (att) that Buddhism 
rejects is constituted: the feeling of ‘I am’ (‘asm’ti), the sense of ‘I am this’ (‘ayam-aham-asm’ti), 
and the concept/conceit of ‘I am’ (asmi-mna) – all of which Buddhas and Arahants by de nition 
do not possess.  Hence, it is argued that, while the ‘pure I’ does not refer to some permanent ‘entity’ 
called ‘self’, nor is it merely an empty, non-referring, conventional linguistic marker: it has not merely 
a ‘use’, but a genuine meaning, which derives from the intrinsic, irreducible, and ‘pre-linguistic’ 
experiential structure of ‘consciousness-of’ itself.  What is more, this meaning is not only recognised 
and admitted, but actively utilised, within the doctrine and methodology of early Buddhism, without 
any sense of contradicting the axiom of anatt.
1.  Preliminary (1): The axiom of anattā
This essay aims to provide a very condensed and merely introductory ‘snapshot’ of just 
a few of the many and very deep correlations that exist between transcendental phenomenology (TP) 
and early P
i Buddhadhamma (EB); but the elements of this ‘snapshot’ are organized around what 
is arguably the most essential theme – one might even say, ‘philosophical problem’ – at the heart of 
both TP and EB.  It is the intention of this essay not to contradict the fundamental EB axiom of anatt, 
‘not-self’.  In other words, the arguments presented here will not posit any essentially permanent 
subjective or objective entity or identity called att, or ‘self’.  Nor will they assert ‘asm’ti, ‘I am’; 
1  I would gratefully like to thank Peter Harvey for his helpful and encouraging comments on and questions about 
the previous version of this paper.  I hope that through my addressing his comments and questions, the clarity of this paper 
has been improved for the bene t of others.  I would also like to register my respect for and appreciation of the great 
work accomplished by Bhikkhus Bodhi and hnissaro: without their beautiful efforts, it would have required at least two 
more lifetimes for me to gain the understanding of early P
i Buddhadhamma which they have helped me to gain within 
a fraction of this lifetime.  I also deeply and gratefully thank the International Association of Buddhist Universities for 
accepting this paper as part of its 2011/2012 conference program.
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or ‘ayam aham asm’ti, ‘I am this’; or asmi-mna, the ‘I am’ concept/conceit; or again, ahakra, 
‘I-making’, or mamakra, ‘mine-making’.
However, these arguments will propose the conclusion that ‘pure subjectivity’ is an inherent 
and irreducible property of intentional consciousness (i.e., ‘consciousness-of’), an essential aspect of 
the actual process of lived conscious experience;2 and that there is a de nite phenomenological sense 
in which, when everything else has been ‘excluded’ and ‘reduced’, ‘pure consciousness-of’ remains 
as an absolutely irreducible principle.  But neither pure consciousness-of nor its intrinsic subjectivity 
can constitute (or be constituted as) a ‘self’ of any kind: they are ‘transcendental’ facts, equivalent to 
‘pure emptiness’.3  Moreover, if there were no phenomenon whatsoever for consciousness-of to be 
conscious-of, then, given that consciousness-of already apodictically demonstrates the irreducible 
nature of ‘being conscious-of’, it could be conscious-of nothing but its own consciousness-of. 
In other words, this would be a form of absolute cessation (nirodha).4
For the sake of clarity and reference, the axiom of anatt will be summarized here in  ve 
items: a general premise and four arguments.5  1. Whatever might be regarded as a personal ‘self’ 
(att) or ‘I am’ (‘asm’ti) will inevitably be just the  ve aggregates of clinging (pañc-updna-
kkhandh) or some one of them.6  2. The  ve aggregates are not ‘self’ because one cannot control 
them to prevent af iction.7  3.  The  ve aggregates are impermanent (anicca), painful (dukkha), and 
have the nature of change (viparima); therefore, it is not be tting or proper (kalla	) to think of 
them as a ‘self’.8  4. It is not acceptable (na khamati) to posit a ‘self’ that is entirely separate from 
experience and the phenomena of experience.9  5. Dependent co-arising is a suf cient and valid 
explanation of the continuity of temporal experience; therefore, there is no need to posit a ‘self’ 
in order to account for that continuity.10  
2  In Husserl’s TP terminology, this is Erlebnis, ‘lived experience’, ‘mental process’ (cf. also fn. 86 below).  In EB 
terminology, this is viñña as a conditioned, constituted, and temporal experiential life-process: i.e., as one of the  ve 
aggregates (khandhas); as a ‘tying down’ (nidna) or ‘link’ in the continuum of dependent co-arising (paicca-samuppda); 
and thus also as the medium of ‘becoming-again’ (punabbhava).  (Cf. also fn. 59 below for further aspects of viñña.)
3  Cf. Section §2.3 below for a clari cation of the terms ‘transcendental’ and ‘transcendent’.
4  Here, ‘cessation’ (nirodha) should not be taken to imply a nihilistic sense of ‘annihilation’.  Rather, it is intended 
more literally, in the sense of ‘stopping’.  For a very similar understanding, cf. Harvey 1995, §11.8, pp. 184-185; §12.3, 
p. 199; §§12.7-8, pp. 201-202.
5  Items 2 to 5 have been adapted from the taxonomy of arguments in support of anatt in Collins 1990, §§3.2.2-5, pp. 
97-110.
6  SN 22.47 (S III 46): ye hi keci . . . sama v brhma v anekavihita	 attna	 samanupassamn samanupassanti, 
sabbete pañcupdnakkhandhe samanupassanti, etesa	 v aññatara	.  The abbreviations DN, MN, SN, and AN will be 
used to refer to sutta numbers, while D, M, S, and A will refer to Pali Text Society volume and page numbers.
7  SN 22.59 (at S III 66): rpa	, bhikkhave, anatt. rpañca hida	, bhikkhave, att abhavissa, nayida	 rpa	 
bdhya sa	vatteyya, labbhetha ca rpe ‘eva	 me rpa	 hotu, eva	 me rpa	 m ahos’ti.  (So also for vedan, 
saññ, sakhr, viñña.)
8  SN 22.59 (at S III 67-68): ya	 pannicca	 dukkha	 viparimadhamma	, kalla	 nu ta	 samanupassitu	: ‘eta	 mama, 
esohamasmi, eso me att’ti?
9  Cf. the refutations in DN 15 (at D II 67-69), which will be discussed below (cf. §4).  (Cf. also Bodhi 2010, pp. 42-48, 
for a detailed discussion of those arguments.)  The arguments 3 and 4 above, taken together, constitute a nice dilemmatic 
argument in support of anatt.
10  The locus classicus is MN 38 (M I 256).  I do not think that this argument can be treated as an independent one, as it 
only has decisive force in combination with the arguments of 3 and 4.
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2.  Preliminary (2): Pahāna and epokhē
2.1. Pahna
In EB, the assutav puthujjana is the ordinary, common person (puthujjana) who has either not 
heard or not understood (assutav) the ‘transcendental’11 instruction of the Dhamma.  Such a person 
is contrasted to the ariya svaka, the ‘noble hearer’ or disciple of the Dhamma.  The Mlapariyya 
Sutta provides an apt ‘phenomenological’ de nition of the assutav puthujjana:
He perceives ‘earth’ from ‘earth’; having perceived ‘earth’ from ‘earth’, he conceives ‘earth’, 
he conceives ‘in earth’, he conceives ‘from earth’, he conceives ‘earth is mine’, he delights 
in ‘earth’.12
This same formula is then applied to ‘absolutely everything’; even, indeed, to Nibbna; 
as though to say: if a person gets this one thing wrong, they get absolutely everything wrong, even 
the ‘ultimate truth’.
The  rst essential ‘antidote’ to this problem is pahna, ‘abandoning’.  The Sabba Sutta 
and Pahna Sutta teach, respectively, ‘the All’ (sabba	) and the ‘Dhamma for abandoning 
All’ (sabba-pahnya dhamma).13  The Natumhka	 Suttas of the Khandhasa	yutta and 
the Sayatanasa	yutta14 also teach exactly this same Dhamma in terms of the  ve clung-to 
aggregates (pañc-updna-kkhandh) and the six sense spheres (sayatana), respectively; but, 
as the title of these suttas, ‘Not Yours’ (na tumhka	), indicates, they teach it with an especially 
interesting twist.  The former sutta says: 
Monks, what is not yours, abandon that.  When you have abandoned that, it will be for your 
bene t and happiness. And what, monks, is not yours?  Form . . . feeling . . . perception . 
. . constitutions . . . consciousness is not yours, abandon that.  When you have abandoned 
that, it will be for your bene t and happiness.’15  
11  In this context, the term ‘transcendental’ could legitimately be understood as a translation of the term lokuttara 
(lit., ‘higher than, above, beyond [uttara] the world [loka]’), as this sometimes occurs in the EB suttas (as distinct from 
the ‘technical’ sense that this term is later given within the Abhidhamma system).  The term is also often translated as 
‘supramundane’.  Thus, e.g., MN 96 (at M II 181): evameva kho aha	 . . . ariya	 lokuttara	 dhamma	 purisassa 
sandhana	 paññapemi, “I . . . declare the noble supramundane Dhamma as a person’s own wealth” (Ñamoli and 
Bodhi 2009, p. 789, §12); MN 117 (at M III 72): atthi . . . sammdihi ariy ansav lokuttar maggag, “[T]here is 
right view that is noble, taintless, supramundane, a factor of the path” (Ñamoli and Bodhi 2009, p. 934, §5).  It is quite 
possible and plausible to argue that, in connection with the Dhamma, the term lokuttara can be understood to have certain 
fundamental implications that it shares in common with the TP sense of the term ‘transcendental’; indeed, this point can 
already be discerned through the correlation between EB pahna and TP epokh that is outlined in this present section; 
but cf. also §2.3 below.
12  Unless otherwise cited, translations from the P
i are by the present author.  MN 1 (M I 1): pathavi	 pathavito 
sañjnti; pathavi	 pathavito saññatv pathavi	 maññati, pathaviy maññati, pathavito maññati, pathavi	 
meti maññati, pathavi	 abhinandati.  Bodhi (2006, p. 27) and Ñamoli and Bodhi (2009, p. 83, §3) translate this 
formula, in accordance with the interpretations of the commentary and sub-commentary, with interpolations, thus: ‘he 
conceives [himself as] earth, he conceives [himself] in earth, he conceives [himself apart] from earth’, etc.  While this 
reading is certainly valid, I nevertheless prefer a quite literal translation of the text, as I believe that this makes good 
(phenomenological) sense, just as it is.
13  SN 35.23-24 (S IV 15-16).
14  SN 22.33 (S III 33) and SN 35.101 (S IV 81), respectively.
15  SN 22.33 (S III 33-34): ya	, bhikkhave, na tumhka	, ta	 pajahatha. ta	 vo pahna	 hitya sukhya bhavissati. 
kiñca, bhikkhave, na tumhka	? rpa	 . . . vedan . . . saññ . . . sakhr . . . viñña	 na tumhka	, ta	 pajahatha. 
ta	 vo pahna	 hitya sukhya bhavissati.
01 Meditation Panel.indd   214 25/5/2555   20:27:27
215
Buddhist Philosophy and 
Meditation Practice
The latter sutta says: 
Monks, what is not yours, abandon that.  When you have abandoned that, it will be 
for your bene t and happiness. And what, monks, is not yours?  Eye . . . visual forms . . . 
eye-consciousness . . . eye-contact . . . whatever feeling arises with eye-contact as condition, 
pleasant or painful or neither-painful-nor-pleasant: that, too, is not yours.  Abandon that. 
When you have abandoned that, it will be for your bene t and happiness.16  
And so also for ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty.  The commentary explains that 
the imperative ‘Abandon. . .’ should be understood to mean: ‘Abandon by means of the abandoning 
of desire and lust’.17  The Dutiya Chanda-ppahna Sutta supports this, but it is also more exhaustive:
With respect to form . . . feeling . . . perception . . . constitutions . . . consciousness: whatever 
desire, lust, delight, craving, taking up and clinging, standpoints, adherences and underlying 
tendencies of the mind there are: abandon these.  Thus that form . . . feeling . . . perception . . . 
constitutions . . . consciousness will be abandoned, cut off at the root, made like 
an uprooted palm tree, made without (further) becoming, not subject to arising in the future.18
2.2. Epokh.  
In general, it seems true to say that not only human individuals, but human societies, 
cultures, civilizations – indeed, the human species, as such – are born into, live, and die within 
a certain ‘pregiven’ and unquestioned attitude towards and assumption about ‘the world’ and their 
relationship to ‘the world’.  This is true not only in ordinary, ‘pre-theoretical’ life, but also in the case 
of the positive natural sciences; and even, for most people, in religion and religious life.  Ordinary, 
everyday life; the life of science; the life of religion; all of them share and are grounded upon one 
and the same ‘natural attitude’ (natürliche Einstellung).
In this natural attitude, ‘the world’ is given as a self-evident objective and real fact: it exists 
in front of us, around us, and we live in it: we perceive it, experience it, and act in it.  It is ‘simply 
there, ‘on hand’’.19  The ‘world’ was before each of us and will be after each of us; it is independent 
of us; it is just as it is, from its own side, not from ours; and we see it and know it just as it is – 
including its ‘illusions’ and ‘hallucinations’ – as though these were simply re ected in our minds 
as in a blank and passive mirror.  The world is made up of objects; and we, too, are objects in 
the world.  Yet the world exists outside of us: we each have our own separate, inner, private, subjective 
life, our mental life; but the real world is external, public, objective, and physical.20
16  SN 35.101 (S IV 81-82): ya	, bhikkhave, na tumhka	, ta	 pajahatha. ta	 vo pahna	 hitya sukhya bhavissati. 
kiñca, bhikkhave, na tumhka	?  cakkhu . . . rp . . . cakkhuviñña	 . . . cakkhusamphasso . . . yampida	 
cakkhusamphassapaccay uppajjati vedayita	 sukha	 v dukkha	 v adukkhamasukha	 v tampi na tumhka	. ta	 
pajahatha. ta	 vo pahna	 hitya sukhya bhavissati.
17  Spk II 265: pajahathti chandargappahnena pajahatha.
18  SN 22.112 (S III 161): rpe . . . vedanya  . . . saññya  . . . sakhresu . . . viññe . . . yo chando yo rgo y nand y 
tah ye upayupdn cetaso adhihnbhinivesnusay, te pajahatha.  eva	 ta	 rpa	 . . . s vedan . . . s saññ . . . 
te sakhr . . . ta	 viñña	 pahna	 bhavissati ucchinnamla	 tlvatthukata	 anabhva	kata	 yati	 
anuppdadhamma	.
19  Husserl 1982, §27, p. 51; Husserl 1976a, §27, p. ‘einfach da . . . „vorhanden“. . .’.  This section begins with a nice ‘ rst 
personal’ description of the natural attitude.
20  Cf., e.g., Husserl 1982, §30, pp. 56-57; Husserl 1976a, §30, pp. 60-61.
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When the scienti c attitude says that ‘reality’ is what is really ‘there’ when our own merely 
subjective consciousness is not ‘there’, and then tries to posit and study that ‘mind-independent’ 
reality, it is simply intensifying the natural attitude.  When the religious attitude says that one must 
be good and do good ‘in this world’, so that one can be granted access to a ‘better world’, perhaps 
a ‘heavenly world’, it, too, is simply practising the natural attitude.  Something remains 
fundamentally unquestioned, fundamentally hidden from view, in this natural attitude.  Husserl 
writes of the ‘natural attitude’:
Daily practical living is naïve.  It is immersion in the already-given world, whether it 
be experiencing, or thinking, or valuing, or acting.  Meanwhile all those productive 
intentional functions of experiencing, because of which physical things are simply there, 
go on anonymously.  The experiencer knows nothing about them, and likewise nothing 
about his productive thinking…  Nor is it otherwise in the positive sciences.  They are 
naïvetés of a higher level.21
For Husserl, the  rst essential ‘antidote’ to the ‘natural attitude’ is what he calls the epokh
– an ancient Greek word meaning ‘check, cessation’; and in late Hellenistic philosophy, having 
the applied sense, ‘suspension of judgment’.22  For Husserl, the epokh is the radical suspension or 
exclusion of the ‘natural attitude’ and all that it implies.  He argues that the way in which we give 
‘validity’ to our sense of the ‘world’ – with ‘ourselves’ as ‘objects’ within it – cannot be examined, 
let alone overcome, from within the natural attitude, because the natural attitude is always-already 
the effect of that bestowal of ‘validity’.23 We need to step back from, to step out of, that attitude, 
in order to see how it is constituted in the  rst instance, and what it obscures from view; in other 
words, to see what is really and truly ‘here’.  He describes this as a shift from a ‘two-dimensional’ 
to a ‘three-dimensional’ perspective, speaking of the ‘antagonism . . . between the ‘patent’ life of 
the plane and the ‘latent’ life of depth’.24  ‘This is not a “view”, an “interpretation” bestowed upon 
the world,’ he says.25  All such ‘views’ have their ground in the pregiven world: but the epokh frees 
us from this ground itself: we stand ‘above’ the world, which becomes for us a pure ‘phenomenon’.26
Husserl  rst describes the epokh as a ‘“parenthesizing” or “excluding”’, as a ‘refraining 
from judgment’,27 or ‘better, refraining from belief’;28 but all of this, he says, is perfectly compatible 
with an ‘unshakable conviction of evident truth’.29  More explicitly, he says: ‘We put out of 
action the general positing which belongs to the essence of the natural attitude.’  Thus, 
21  Husserl 1970a, §64, pp. 152-153; Husserl 1950, §64, p. 179: ‘Das tägliche praktische Leben ist naiv, es ist ein 
in die vorgegebene Welt Hineinerfahren, Hineindenken, Hineinwerten, Hineinhandeln.  Dabei vollziehen sich alle die 
intentionalen Leistungen des Erfahrens, wodurch die Dinge schlechthin da sind, anonym: der Erfahrende weiß von ihnen 
nichts, ebenso nichts vom leistenden Denken. . .  Nicht anders in den positiven Wissenschaften. Sie sind Naivitäten 
höherer Stufe. . .’.
22  Cf. Liddell et al. 1996, p. 677.2.
23  Husserl 1970b, §39, p. 148; Husserl 1954, §39, p. 151.
24  Husserl 1970b, §32, p. 120; Husserl 1954, §32, p. 122: ‘der Antagonisumus zwischen dem „patenten“ Flächenleben 
und dem „latenten“ Tiefenleben. . .’.
25  Husserl 1970b, §41, p. 152; Husserl 1954, §41, p. 155: ‘Das ist aber nicht eine „Auffassung“, eine „Interpretation“, 
die der Welt zuerteilt wird.’
26  Husserl 1970b, §41, p. 152; Husserl 1954, §41, p. 155.
27  Husserl 1982, §31, pp. 59-60; Husserl 1976a, §31, p. 64: ‘„Einklammerung“ oder „Ausschaltung“’; ‘Urteilsenthaltung’.
28  Husserl 1976b, p. 485: ‘besser: Glaubensenth‹altung›’.  (Marginal note added by Husserl to his copy of the printed text.) 
29  Husserl 1982, §31, p. 60; Husserl 1976a, §31, p. 64: ‘unerschütterlichen, weil evidenten Überzeugnung von der 
Wahrheit’.
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the phenomenological epokh ‘completely shuts me off from any judgment about 
spatiotemporal factual being’.30  Husserl describes the epokh, and the phenomenological or 
transcendental attitude that it awakens, as ‘a total change of the natural attitude, such that we no 
longer live, as heretofore, as human beings within natural existence, constantly effecting the validity 
of the pre-given world’.31  It is ‘by no means a temporary act’, but taken up ‘once and for all’.32
Thus, the epokh is ‘a complete personal transformation, comparable in the beginning to a religious 
conversion’; but beyond this, he says, it ‘bears within itself the signi cance of the greatest existential 
transformation which is assigned as a task to humankind as such’.33
2.3. A clari cation of TP terms: ‘transcendental’ and ‘transcendent’
Never can the limit of the world be reached by travelling;
But nor is there release from the painful without having reached the world’s limit.34
This cryptic passage from the Rohitassa Sutta elegantly captures the sense of the two mutually-
related yet mutually-exclusive TP terms, ‘transcendent’ and ‘transcendental’.  This correspondence 
is neither merely coincidental nor merely metaphorical: rather, it is not only philosophically, but 
phenomenologically, quite precise.35  Thus: in the quest to  nd an escape from ‘the painful’ (dukkha), 
even if one could travel forever, one would never reach the limit or end (anta) of the ‘world’ (loka). 
By its very nature, the ‘spatiotemporal world’ and all that it comprises is transcendent with respect 
to any ‘moment’ of experience, or even any inde nite ‘continuum’ of experience: it ‘exceeds’ 
the grasp of experience, and does so in an ‘objective’ and ‘necessary’ manner.  This is the sense of 
‘the limit of the world’ (lokassa-anta) in the  rst verse of the ‘riddle’.  In the second verse, however, 
30  Husserl 1982, §31, p. 61; Husserl 1976a, §32, p. 65: ‘Die zum Wesen der natürlichen Einstellung gehörige 
Generalthesis setzen wir außer Aktion. . .’; ‘. . . die mir jedes Urteil über räumlich-zeitliches Dasein völlig verschließt.’
31  Husserl 1970b, §39, p. 148; Husserl 1954, §39, p. 151: ‘. . . eine totale Änderung der natürlichen Einstellung, eine 
Änderung, in der wir nicht mehr wie bisher als Menschen des natürlichen Daseins im ständigen Geltungsvollzug der 
vorgegebenen Welt leben. . .’.
32  Husserl 1970b, §40, p. 150; Husserl 1954, §40, p. 153: ‘keineswegs ein . . . bleibender Akt’; ‘ein für allemal 
(entschließen)’.
33  Husserl 1970b, §35, p. 137 (translation modi ed); Husserl 1954, §35, p. 140: ‘. . . eine völlige personale Wandlung 
zu erwirken berufen ist, die zu vergleichen wäre zunächst mit einer religiösen Umkehrung, die aber darüber hinaus die 
Bedeutung der größten existenziellen Wandlung in sich birgt, die der Menschheit als Menschheit aufgegeben ist.’
34  SN 2.26 (at S I 62) = AN 4.45 (at A II 49): gamanena na pattabbo, lokassanto kudcana	. | na ca appatv lokanta	, 
dukkh atthi pamocana	. ||
35  The Rohitassa Sutta provides us with the Buddha’s profoundly phenomenological (and well-known) de nition of 
‘world’ (loka): ‘Just in this very fathom-long cadaver, percipient and endowed with mind, I make known the world, 
and the arising of the world, and the cessation of the world, and the path leading to the cessation of the world’. 
(imasmi	yeva bymamatte kaevare sasaññimhi samanake lokañca paññapemi lokasamudayañca lokanirodhañca 
lokanirodhagminiñca paipadan ti, S I 62.)  The sutta is closely related to the Lokantagamana Sutta (SN 35.116, S IV 
93), which further enhances the preceding de nition: ‘(That) by which, . . . in the world, one is percipient of the world, 
one is a conceiver of the world, that is called ‘world’ in the discipline of the Noble One.  And by what, . . . in the world, is 
one percipient of the world, a conceiver of the world?  By the eye . . . by the ear . . . by the nose . . . by the tongue . . . by 
the body . . . by the mental faculty, . . . in the world, one is percipient of the world, a conceiver of the world.’’  (yena kho . 
. . lokasmi	 lokasaññ hoti lokamn aya	 vuccati ariyassa vinaye loko. kena ca . . . lokasmi	 lokasaññ hoti lokamn? 
cakkhun kho ... sotena kho ... ghnena kho ... jivhya kho ... kyena kho ... manena kho . . . lokasmi	 lokasaññ hoti 
lokamn. S IV 95.)  Cf. also SN 35.23-29 (S IV 15-21) on ‘the All’ (sabba	).
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‘the world’s limit’ (loka-anta)36 takes on a very different meaning.  It refers to the attainment of that 
which is ‘absolutely beyond’ the ‘spatiotemporal world’ as such: that which the ‘world’, and all that 
it comprises, cannot ‘reach’ or ‘touch’; namely, of course, Nibbna.37  In just this sense, Nibbna is 
transcendental with respect to all phenomena: its nature is such that it is absolutely non-phenomenal.38 
The means to attain the ‘world’s limit’, and thus to transcend the world’s inherent and inevitable 
painfulness, can only be realized through the fully puri ed and fully liberated consciousness; for 
consciousness, too, by its very nature, necessarily partakes of the ‘transcendental’, as well as of 
the ‘transcendent’.
In his later writings, Husserl refers to what he calls ‘the transcendental problem’ 
(das transzendentale Problem): a ‘universal’ problem which ‘arises from a general turning around 
of the natural attitude’.39  As we have just seen in §2.2, the natural attitude assumes that ‘the real 
world is pre-given to us as self-evidently existing, ever at hand’.40  To ‘reverse’ the natural attitude 
is, in one sense, ‘to put it out of play’:41 an allusion to the literal sense of the epokh as a ‘suspending’ 
of that attitude.  But it is also, thereby, ‘to compel a new attitude’, which Husserl calls 
‘the transcendental’.42  This emerges because the philosophical attention is now free to be directed 
towards ‘the life of consciousness’ (Bewußtseinsleben), which the epokh naturally and spontaneously 
reveals.  One becomes aware that ‘the world’, previously taken for granted as simply ‘pre-given’, 
is in fact something that in every respect ‘appears’ in, has meaning in, and is validated by, that same 
consciousness.43  Previously, ‘the real world’ had our complete and one-sided attention and concern, 
and ‘consciousness’ was barely – if at all – noticed, let alone investigated.  Now, through the epokh, 
we are intimately aware of our own consciousness-of ‘the world’, and ‘the world’ is thus radically 
disclosed as a ‘pure phenomenon’ in our consciousness.  But precisely herein resides the interesting 
‘transcendental problem’.  In his last major but un nished text, Husserl writes:
The empty generality of the epokh does not of itself clarify anything; it is only the gate of 
entry through which one must pass in order to be able to discover the new world of pure subjectivity. 
The actual discovery is a matter of concrete, extremely subtle and differentiated work.44
The ‘work’ to which Husserl refers, here, is the ‘transcendental reduction’, which is made 
possible through the attainment of the ‘transcendental attitude’ of the epokh: ‘a reduction of 
“the” world to the transcendental phenomenon “world”, a reduction thus also to its correlate, 
36  The slight difference in form between the two compounds is no doubt metri causa, and not otherwise signi cant.
37  Cf., e.g., D I 221-223; D III 274; M I 328-330; M III 63; A I 152; A V 106; Ud 9; Ud 80-81; to mention a few key 
examples.  Like Ven. Thanissaro, P. Harvey, and others, I intuit that there must be an essential and necessary ‘transcendental 
identity’ between viñña anidassana and Nibbna.
38  Hence, Nibbna is categorically de ned in the suttas as the one and only ‘unconstituted element’ (asakhat dhtu, 
cf. D III 274, M III 63).
39  Husserl 1997, §11, p. 238 (translation modi ed); Husserl 1962, §11, p. 331: ‘entspringt aus einer allgemeinen 
Umwendung der natürlichen Einstellung’.
40  Husserl 1962, §11, p. 331: ‘ist uns die reale Welt . . . vorgegeben als die selbstverständlich seiende, immerzu 
vorhandene’.
41  Husserl 1962, §11, p. 332: ‘außer Spiel zu setzen’.
42  Husserl 1997, §11, p. 238 (translation modi ed); Husserl 1962, §11, p. 332: ‘eine neue [sc. Einstellung] erzwingen, 
die wir die transzendentale nennen’.
43  Husserl 1997, §11, p. 239; Husserl 1962, §11, p. 332.
44  Husserl 1970b, §71, p. 257 (modi ed); Husserl 1954, §37, p. 260: ‘Die leere Allgemeinheit der Epoché klärt noch 
nichts auf, sondern ist nur das Eingangstor, mit dessen Durchschreiten die neue Welt der reinen Subjektivität entdeckt 
werden kann.  Die wirkliche Entdeckung ist Sache der konkreten, höchst dif zilen und differenzierten Arbeit.’
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transcendental subjectivity, in and through whose “conscious life” the world . . . attains and always 
has attained its whole content and ontic validity.’45  The transcendental reduction clari es and brings 
into sharp relief what Husserl had much earlier described as ‘the essential relationship between 
transcendental and transcendent being’: ‘this most radical of all ontological distinctions – being 
as consciousness and being as something which becomes “manifested” in consciousness, 
“transcendent” being’.46  This correlation engenders profound insights, but also profound questions. 
Even so, many of these profound questions are, in an important sense, merely secondary or derivative: 
they are rooted in, and can be traced back to, the truly fundamental ground of the ‘transcendental 
problem’, which reveals many layers of ‘ascent’ or ‘descent’.47
[W]e have become aware of a peculiar split or cleavage, so we may call it, which runs 
through all our life-process; namely, that between the anonymously functioning subjectivity, which is 
continuously constructing objectivity for us, and the always, by virtue of the functioning of anonymous 
subjectivity, pre-given objectivity, the world.  The world also includes within it human beings with 
their minds, with their human conscious life.  When we consider the pervasive and unsuspendable 
relatedness of the pregiven and self-evidently existing world to our functioning subjectivity, 
humankind and we ourselves appear as intentionally produced formations whose sense of being 
objectively real and whose veri cation of being are both self-constituting in subjectivity.  Also, 
the being of the objective . . . has now appeared as a meaning that constitutes itself within 
consciousness itself.48
But even the task of further clarifying and comprehending ‘this correlation between 
constituting subjectivity and constituted objectivity’49 is not yet the deepest expression of 
the ‘transcendental problem’.  Rather, the fundamental matter is that this ‘constituting subjectivity’ 
in no sense whatsoever actually ‘appears’ within the ‘constituted objective world’.  For, even our 
own bodies, our sensations, our emotions, and our thoughts are ultimately ‘constituted phenomena’ 
that ‘appear’ within, and as elements of, ‘the world’: that is to say, they, too, ‘appear’ to our 
‘transcendental subjective consciousness’.  However, ‘transcendental subjectivity’ does not itself 
‘appear’; and, through re ection and analysis, it becomes quite evident that, in principle, it would 
be a sheer countersense to expect or to suppose that it could or should in any sense whatsoever 
45  Husserl 1970b, §42, pp. 151-153; Husserl 1954, §42, p. 154: ‘. . . einer Reduktion „der“ Welt auf das transzendentale 
Phänomen „Welt“ und damit auf ihr Korrelat: die transzendentale Subjektivität, in und aus deren „Bewußtseinsleben“ die . . . 
Welt . . . ihren ganzen Inhalt und ihre Seinsgeltung gewinnt und immer schon gewonnen hat’.
46  Husserl 1982, §76, p. 171; Husserl 1976, §76, p. 159: ‘[die] Wesensbeziehung zwischen transzendentalem und 
transzendentem Sein’; ‘dieser radikalsten aller Seinsunterscheidungen - Sein als Bewußtsein und Sein als sich im 
Bewußtsein „bekundendes“ , „transzendentes“ Sein’.
47  Husserl uses metaphors both of ‘ascent’ and ‘descent’ for the process of the reduction.  Cf., e.g., Husserl 1997, §13, p. 245; 
1970b, §42, p. 153, an allusion to Goethe, Faust, Part II, Act I, Sc. 5 (where, indeed, we read: ‘Sink down (descend), then! 
I could also say: Climb (ascend)! / ’Tis all the same.’ (Versinke, denn!  Ich könnt’ auch sagen: steige! / ’s ist einerlei.’)
48  Husserl 1997, §12, p. 242; Husserl 1962, §12, p. 336: ‘[E]iner eigentümlichen Spaltung, so können wir uns auch 
ausdrücken, waren wir innegeworden, die durch unser ganzes Leben hindurchgeht, nämlich zwischen der anonym 
fungierenden, der immerfort Objektivität für uns konstituierenden Subjektivität und zwischen der jeweils und vermöge 
dieses Fungierens vorgegebenen Objectivität, der Welt.  In sich faßt diese Welt auch die Menschen mit ihren Seelen, 
ihrem menschlichen Bewußtseinsleben.  In der Beachtung der durchgängigen und unaufhebbaren Bezogenheit der 
vorgegebenen Welt, der selbstverständlich daseienden, auf die fungierende Subjektivität, erscheinen die Menschen und 
wir selbst als intentionale Gebilde, nach dem objektiv-realen Sinn und ‹ihrer› Seinsgeltung sich in der Subjektivität 
konstituierend.  Auch das . . . Sein des Objektiven erschien als ein im Bewußtsein selbst sich konstituierender Sinn.’ 
49  Husserl 1997, §13, p. 243; Husserl 1962, §13, p. 336: ‘diese Korrelation zwischen konstituierender Subjektivität und 
konstituierter Objektivität’.
01 Meditation Panel.indd   219 25/5/2555   20:27:28
220
Conference
‘appear’, as a phenomenon amongst phenomena.  We see, hear, smell, taste, touch, and think 
‘the world’ and what we identify as our psychophysical ‘selves’ within ‘the world’; but that subjective 
consciousness-of in dependence upon which we see, hear, smell, taste, touch, and think can never 
itself appear as an ‘object’ or ‘phenomenon’.  It is not itself anything ‘in the world’; yet, there would 
be no ‘appearing’ of ‘the world’ without it.  For this reason, above all others, Husserl refers to it 
as ‘transcendental’: it is ‘beyond’ or ‘above’50 all that ‘appears’ – i.e., the ‘physical’ and ‘mental’ 
‘world’-phenomena – and yet it is also the ‘limit’ of ‘the world’: for, ‘the world’ cannot ‘appear’ 
without it, and is inseparably correlated with it.  For these same reasons, however, ‘transcendental 
subjectivity’, or what Husserl also calls the ‘transcendental ‘I’’, is essentially empty, in itself, of all 
‘phenomenal content’.
3. Intentionality and subjectivity: irreducible properties of ‘consciousness-of’
What the epokh and the transcendental reduction reveal,  rst of all, is the apodictic 
(i.e., self-evident and self-proving) fact of consciousness itself; more speci cally, they reveal 
that consciousness is inherently and fundamentally a consciousness-of… This quality of being 
conscious-of… is called ‘intentionality’.51  The common sense of the word, ‘intend’, i.e., ‘to have 
a purpose in mind,52 is included within the wider and deeper phenomenological sense of ‘intentionality’, 
but only as one possible kind of ‘intentional’ mode or act.  The essential sense of phenomenological 
‘intending’, of intentionality as such, refers to the way in which consciousness is ‘turned’ or ‘directed’ 
towards what it is conscious-of; and, moreover, the way in which consciousness thereby gives ‘sense’ 
or ‘meaning’ (Sinn) to all that it is conscious-of, even purely through the act of being conscious-of it.
It is not accidental that Buddhaghosa, in explicating the compound nmarpa, de nes 
the term nma, which literally means ‘name’, as though it were derived from the verb namati, 
‘to bend, to direct’: ‘[A]ll that should be de ned as “mentality” (nma) in the sense of bending 
(namana) because of its bending on to the object.’53  This is not sound etymology; but I think it 
is fairly obvious that Buddhaghosa was trying to express and justify a sound phenomenological 
intuition through this word play.  Voicing the same intuition, the commentary to this passage says: 
‘Bending in the direction of the object means that there is no occurrence without an object; it is in 
the sense of that sort of bending. . .’.54  Here, ‘bending in the direction of the object’ is, in the P
i, 
literally: ‘bending or inclining with the face towards the object’ (rammaa-abhimukha-namana	). 
50  The words ‘transcendent’, ‘transcendental’, and the verb ‘transcend’ (doing service for both of the former senses) 
derive from the Latin trnscendere: trns, ‘across, through, beyond’ + scandere, ‘to climb’.  A precise P
i correlate 
would be atikkamati: ati, ‘over, above’ + kamati, ‘step, walk, go, walk, progress’ (cf. Cone 2001, p. 60.1-2); but the more 
usual form found in the EB suttas, with the technical sense of ‘transcending’ (in the context of the four higher meditative 
states, or arpa jhnas) is samatikkamati (as a gerund, samatikkamma) where the pre x sa	- functions as an intensi er, 
with the sense ‘thoroughly, fully, perfectly’ (cf. Rhys Davids and Stede 1998, p. 655.2; Monier-Williams 1993, p. 1152.1).
51  From the Latin intendere, ‘to stretch forth, give one’s attention to’, from tendere, ‘to stretch’.
52  This is very close in meaning to ceteti, ‘forms an idea in the mind; thinks about, is intent upon; has in mind (to); forms 
an intention (to); strives mentally for’ (Cone 2010, p. 167.2); and hence to cetan, which could be translated as ‘volitional 
intent’ (cf. also Cone 2010, p. 164.2, 1.(ii)).
53  Ñamoli 1991, XVIII.3; Vism 587: . . . sabbampeta	 rammabhimukha	 namanato namanahena nma nti 
vavatthapetabba	.  I shall leave aside, here, the question of whether ‘mentality’ (or again, ‘mind’) is an appropriate 
translation of the meaning of the term nma in the compound nmarpa. 
54  Ñamoli 1991, XVIII.3, n. 4, citing Pj I 78: . . . rammabhimukhanamana	 rammaena vin appavatti, tena 
namanahena. . .
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Of course, what is intended here is the sense in which consciousness is directed towards its 
‘object’.  This same essential sense can, I believe, be seen in a sutta passage such as: ‘See his 
concentration well developed and his mind well liberated – not bent forward [abhinata	] and not 
bent back [apanata	]. . .’55  Here, abhinata, ‘bent towards, inclined towards’ is a past participle 
formed as though from *abhinamati (abhi + namati); and ‘apanata’, ‘bent away, disinclined, averse’, 
is the past participle of apanamati (apa + namati).56
In revealing consciousness and its intentionality (consciousness-of), the epokh and reduction 
also reveal, concomitantly, the sense in which consciousness-of is fundamentally characterized by 
‘subjectivity’.  The fact that ‘consciousness-of’ is consciousness directing – metaphorically ‘stretching’ 
or ‘extending’ – itself towards its object means that it is not its ‘object’; that it is, in a certain sense, 
relating itself to its ‘object’ from ‘within itself’; i.e., from within its own self-evident nature, which 
is precisely to be conscious-of.57  This inherent in ection of consciousness-of towards phenomena 
is precisely that property of consciousness-of to which the term ‘subjectivity’ implicitly refers. 
In fact, I believe that careful re ection and meditation will reveal that a ‘non-subjective’ consciousness 
is a phenomenological impossibility, because a consciousness that is not a consciousness-of would 
be no more than a pure ‘potentiality’ of consciousness.
A very important point that I would like to make clear is that ‘mental acts’ or ‘experiences’ 
such as ‘feeling’ (vedan), ‘perception’ (saññ), or ‘thinking’ (vitakka-vicra; maññati), and 
even advanced meditative states of being purely percipient or aware (saññ),58 are inevitably 
and irreducibly modes of consciousness-of, and are therefore intrinsically characterized by 
subjectivity.  The term ‘I’ (aha	) is problematic because it is very ambiguous and has several 
different senses and uses, the most important of which I shall discuss below (cf. §4).  However, I argue 
that, ultimately, all of its various senses must derive from one fundamental and purely experiential 
fact, which is pre-linguistic: namely, the inherent subjectivity of consciousness-of.  Therefore, it 
is very important to distinguish, on the one hand, between the purely phenomenological sense of 
the term ‘I’ as referring back to ‘pure subjectivity’, which is not a ‘concept’ but a (transcendental) 
property of conscious experience; and, on the other hand, the manner in which  this phenomenological 
sense – a sense not noticed, let alone comprehended, within the natural attitude – can be turned into, 
or constituted as (abhisakhata), concepts/conceits (mna) and underlying tendencies (anusaya) such 
as ‘I am’ (‘asm’ti’) or ‘I am this’ (‘ayam-aham-asm’ti).  These are ontological concepts, which can 
only have ‘sense’ if they are taken to refer to something that ‘exists’, ‘manifestly’ or ‘objectively’. 
For this reason, such concepts/conceits can refer to nothing other than the ‘ ve clung-to aggregates’ 
(pañc-updna-kkhandh), or to some ideal abstraction that is ultimately derived from these; this 
55  Bodhi 2000, p. 117.  SN 1.38 (S I 39): passa samdhi	 subhvita	 cittañca suvimutta	, na cbhinata	 na 
cpanata	. . .
56  Cf Cone 2001, pp. 199.1, 164.1.
57  Husserl does use the term ‘subject’ (Subjekt) in its relation to the ‘object’ (Objekt; Gegenstand); and sometimes 
speaks of intentionality in terms of the ‘I-pole’ (Ichpol) in its relation to the ‘object-pole’ (Gegenstandspol) or ‘counter-pole 
(Gegenpol).  (Cf., e.g., Husserl 1970b, §50, pp. 170-171; Husserl 1954, §50, pp. 173-174; Husserl 1989, §25, pp. 111-114; 
Husserl 1952, §25, pp. 105-107).  The image of a ‘pole’ or ‘ray’ is signi cant, because it presupposes that the two ends of 
the ‘pole’ are inseparable from the ‘pole’ itself; and this is an important aspect of the concept of intentionality of which 
Husserl was well aware.  In any event, I shall consistently avoid the term ‘subject’, for reasons that will become clear in 
the course of this paper; and will focus, instead, upon the property of ‘subjectivity’.
58  Cf., e.g., AN 11.7 (A V 318f.), apparently describing animitta cetosamdhi (Harvey 1986, p. 42, reaches the same 
conclusion).  Of the meditator in this samdhi, it is said: saññ ca pana ass ti, ‘and yet he is percipient (aware)’. 
(For a translation, cf. Nizamis 2011, AN 11.7 (cf. also AN 11.8), forthcoming).
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being the basis of the concept of a permanent att (‘self’, ‘soul’), as an individual and ontologically 
independent entity.  The phenomenological understanding of the term ‘I’ has nothing to do with such 
ontological abstractions and positions.
4.  The problem
In Khemaka Sutta, the Venerable Khemaka says:
Venerable friends, I [aha	] do not say “I am” [‘asm’ti] of material form, and I do not 
say “I am” apart from material form.  I do not say “I am” of feeling, and I do not say 
“I am” apart from feeling; I do not say “I am” of perception, and I do not say “I am” apart 
from perception; I do not say “I am” of constitutions, and I do not say “I am” apart from 
constitutions; I do not say “I am” of sense-consciousness,59 and I do not say “I am” apart 
from sense-consciousness.  Nevertheless, with respect to these  ve clung-to aggregates, 
“I am” is found in me, but I do not regard (them as) “I am this”.60
He explains that, even though the  ve lower fetters may have been abandoned by a noble 
disciple (ariya-svaka), ‘with respect to the  ve aggregates subject to clinging, he has a residual 
“I am” concept/conceit, an “I am” desire, an “I am” underlying tendency not yet removed’.61
Khemaka likens this lingering sense of ‘I am’ to the scent of a lotus: one can’t say that the scent 
belongs to any particular part of the  ower; rather, it belongs to the  ower as a whole.62  However, 
when the disciple dwells constantly contemplating the growth and decay of the  ve aggregates, this 
residual sense of ‘I am’ is eventually uprooted.63  Indeed, at the end of the sutta we are told that 
Khemaka’s mind was freed from the savas through non-clinging (anupdya).64  Thus, Khemaka’s 
problem was resolved.  But ours now commences.
59  When the term viñña is used speci cally in the sense of viñña-khandha, I sometimes translate ‘sense-
consciousness’: this is in fact the speci c de nition of viñña-khandha.  Cf. SN 22.56 (at S III 61): katamañca, bhikkhave, 
viñña	? chayime, bhikkhave, viññaky: cakkhuviñña	, sotaviñña	, ghnaviñña	, jivhviñña	, 
kyaviñña	, manoviñña	. The same de nition is given in SN 12.2 (at S II 4) of viñña as the third link in 
the 12-nidna formula of paiccasamuppda.  In other contexts of the paiccasamuppda formula, however, viñña is 
described in terms of the rebirth-process, in which case it cannot be active sense-consciousness, since nmarpa has not 
yet developed: cf. DN 15 (at D II 63).  On this topic, cf. Wijesekera 1994, §17, pp. 198-200.  The term viñña also has 
at least two other senses and usages in the suttas: the viñña of the ‘immaterial meditative states’ (arpa jhnas), which 
need not be the viñña of an Arahant, but which transcends the material (and hence bodily) sense-spheres; and the sense 
of viñña	 anidassana	 ananta	 sabbatopabha	 (DN 11 (at D I 223); MN 49 (at M II 329)), which may be correlated 
with viñña in the sense of appatihita	 viñña	 avirha	 anabhisakhacca vimutta	 (e.g., SN 22.53 (at S III 53)) 
and: appatihitena ca . . . viññena . . . parinibbuto (SN 4.23 (at S I 122), SN 22.87 (at S III 124)).  (On this topic, 
cf. Thanissaro 2011, DN 11, fn. 1; MN 49, fn. 9; MN 109, fn. 1.  Cf. also fn. 80 below, for references to Harvey 1995.) 
These various inter-related senses of viñña may be understood as differing conditioned and unconditioned affections 
of ‘intentional consciousness’.
60  SN 22.89 (at S III 130): na khvha	, vuso, rpa	 ‘asm’ti vadmi; napi aññatra rp ‘asm’ti vadmi. na vedana	... 
na sañña	... na sakhre... na viñña	 ‘asm’ti vadmi; napi aññatra viññ ‘asm’ti vadmi. api ca me, vuso, 
pañcasu updnakkhandhesu ‘asm’ti adhigata	 ‘ayamahamasm’ti na ca samanupassmi.
61  SN 22.89 (at S III 130): yo ca pañcasu updnakkhandhesu anusahagato asmti mno, asmti chando, asmti anusayo 
asamhato.
62  SN 22.89 (at S III 130): ‘pupphassa gandho’ti.
63  SN 22.89 (at S III 131): . . . sopi samugghta	 gacchati.
64  Along with the minds of sixty other elder monks: SN 22.89 (at S III 132): . . . sahimattna	 therna	 bhikkhna	
anupdya savehi cittni vimucci	su, yasmato khemakassa cti.
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Let me imagine that I had the remarkable good fortune to meet Ven. Khemaka once his 
residual sense of ‘I am’ was  nally removed.  I would have liked to inquire, very respectfully, 
about the nature of his consciousness at that time.  From the ample and unambiguous evidence of 
the suttas, I know that there should be no particular technical dif culty in speaking with an Arahant 
(if we speak the same language): he would be able to see me and hear me; he would understand my 
questions; and, out of compassion, he might even make an effort to answer them.
I would have liked to say to him: ‘Bhante, you have  nally eliminated the residual 
conceit of ‘I am’ from your mind.  But now, I am deeply intrigued by the fact that your senses and 
intellect continue to function perfectly.  I also understand that your body is ailing, and that you are 
experiencing severe physical pain.65  These and many other facts demonstrate very clearly to me 
that you are subjectively and intentionally conscious.  I really do believe that you have uprooted 
the residual concept and conceit of ‘I am’.  But it is evident, from the way in which your consciousness 
is functioning, that when you use the word ‘I’, you are not using it merely as a meaningless token 
for the sake of not disrupting convention.  Even though you know that this word ‘I’ cannot refer to 
the khandhas or to anything apart from the khandhas, and so cannot refer to any existing entity at all, 
nevertheless, it seems to me that the word ‘I’ still does have a genuine meaning for you: it refers 
to the pure subjectivity of your consciousness, your consciousness-of. . .  You are clearly conscious-of
me, of the meanings of my words, of the fact that I am asking you about the nature of your own 
present consciousness; just as much as you are conscious-of your bodily pain, and you are 
conscious-of the fact that your mind is fully and  nally liberated.66  To be conscious-of truth, 
to be conscious-of bodily pain: in all cases, to be conscious-of necessarily implies to be subjectively
and intentionally conscious-of...  This strongly suggests to me that there must be a fundamental 
difference between the sense of ‘I am’, and hence also the sense of ‘self’ (att), which you no longer 
possess, and the meaning of ‘I’ as neither more nor less than the pure subjectivity of intentional 
consciousness; without which, there could be no consciousness-of... whatsoever; not even for 
an Arahant.’
The common objection that an Arahant or Tathgata uses the term ‘I’ merely in accordance 
with the linguistic conventions of the unenlightened is poorly formulated.  But consider the following 
verses from the Arahant Sutta (which are not poorly formulated):
No knots exist for one with conceit abandoned [pahna-mnassa];
For him all knots of conceit [mna-ganthassa] are consumed.
Though the wise one has transcended the conceived [vtivatta67 maññata	],
He still might say, ‘I speak’ [‘aha	 vadm’ti],
65  Cf. SN 22.89 (at S III 127).  The suttas contain examples of Arahants experiencing severe bodily pain (e.g., if read 
literally, SN 22.87 (S III 120), SN 35.87 (S IV 55) = MN 144 (M III 263).  The Buddha himself, of course, experienced 
severe bodily pain (cf. SN 1.38 (S I 27), DN 16 (at D II 100); Mil IV.1.8 (Mil 134) cites four cases of injury and illness).
66  Cf., e.g., MN 4 (at M I 23): tassa me eva	 jnato eva	 passato kmsavpi citta	 vimuccittha, bhavsavpi citta	 
vimuccittha, avijjsavpi citta	 vimuccittha. vimuttasmi	 vimuttamiti ña	 ahosi. ‘kh jti, vusita	 brahmacariya	, 
kata	 karaya	, npara	 itthatty’ti abbhaññsi	.  ‘Then, knowing thus, seeing thus, my mind was liberated from 
the unconscious in uence [sava] of sensual desire, from the unconscious in uence of being, and from the unconscious 
in uence of ignorance.  When it was liberated, there was the knowledge, “It is liberated”.  I knew by direct experience 
[abbhaññsi	], “Birth is destroyed, the holy life has been lived, what had to be done has been done, no more for being-here.”’
67  vi + ati (emphatic form of ati, ‘beyond, over; through’: cf. Cone 2001, p. 59.1) + vatta (past participle of vattati in 
the compound ativattati, ‘goes beyond, escapes from’ (cf. Cone 2001, p. 69.1).  Thus, Bodhi’s rendering, ‘has transcended 
the conceived’ for vtivatta maññata	, is, from the TP perspective, an apt translation.
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He might say too, ‘They speak to me’ [‘mama	 vadant’ti].
Skilful, knowing the world’s parlance [loke samañña	],
He uses such terms as mere expressions [vohra-mattena].68
These verses are spoken in reply to the question whether the Arahant, who is by de nition 
khsavo, ‘one with unconscious in uences (savas) destroyed’, would still be able to speak and to 
understand the speech of others; and if so, whether this might be because ‘he has come upon conceit 
[mna	 nu kho so upagamma]’, which is to say, because he has fallen back upon the conceit/concept 
‘I am’ (asmi-mna).69   For, to be sure, in the suttas, Arahants are found to say such things as ‘I eat, 
I sit; my bowl, my robe’, and other such common, conventional talk.70  All that these verses entail is 
that the Arahant still uses words such as aha	 and mama as the ordinary world uses them, although 
he has ‘transcended’ their worldly sense.  But the commentary’s explanation of the answer to this 
question takes a somewhat different slant:
Having abandoned talk that presupposes acquisition (of a ‘self’), he does not breach 
convention, but would speak (in terms of) ‘I and mine’.  If he said, ‘The aggregates eat, 
the aggregates sit, the aggregates’ bowl, the aggregates’ robe’, it is a breach of convention; 
no one would understand.71
This interpretation falls back upon the Abhidhamma-based theory of ‘two truths’, which 
posits two kinds of discourse, the ‘conventionally true’ (sammuti-sacca) and the ‘ultimately true’ 
(paramattha-sacca).  On that view, the conventionally valid locution is ‘I eat’, etc., whereas 
the ‘ultimately true’ locution is the technical one, ‘The  ve aggregates eat’, etc.72  Unfortunately, 
this interpretation completely misses the truly essential point of the problem in question here: 
for it makes no difference whatsoever whether the Arahant says ‘I eat’ or ‘These  ve aggregates 
perform the function of eating’.  The truly crucial point is that the Arahant (or, if one prefers, the  ve 
aggregates) can indeed still speak.  Even in this one act itself the entire phenomenological import 
of subjective intentionality is immediately demonstrated.  And since I am prepared to grant that 
the concept of ‘Arahantship’ is a phenomenologically valid and possible concept, this would entail that 
even an Arahant devoid of the conceit/concept ‘I am’ is nevertheless subjectively and intentionally 
68  Bodhi 2000, p. 102.  SN 1.25 (at S I 14-15): pahnamnassa na santi ganth, | vidhpit mnaganthassa sabbe. | sa 
vtivatto maññata	 sumedho, | aha	 vadmtipi so vadeyya. | mama	 vadanttipi so vadeyya. | loke samañña	 kusalo 
viditv. | vohramattena so vohareyy’ti. ||
69  SN 1.25 (at S I 14).
70  Spk I 51: ‘aha	 bhuñjmi, aha	 nisdmi, mama patto, mama cvaran’ti dikathvohra	.  Cf. Bodhi 2000, p. 360, n. 48.
71  Spk I 51: The passage continues: ‘Therefore, having spoken thus, he expresses (himself) by means of worldly ways 
of speech.’  [att-]upaladdhinissitakatha	 hitv vohrabheda	 akaronto ‘aha	, mam’ti vadeyya. ‘khandh bhuñjanti, 
khandh nisdanti, khandhna	 patto, khandhna	 cvaran’ti hi vutte vohrabhedo hoti, na koci jnti. tasm eva	 
avatv lokavohrena voharatti.  Cf. Bodhi 2000, p. 360, n. 49.  Cf. also MN 74 (at M I 500): eva	 vimuttacitto kho . . . 
bhikkhu na kenaci sa	vadati, na kenaci vivadati, yañca loke vutta	 tena voharati, aparmasan’ti  ‘A bhikkhu with mind 
thus liberated does not agree with anyone, does not dispute with anyone; what is spoken in the world, that he expresses, 
without holding on (to it).’
72  Cf. Nrada 1975, p. 7, for a classical modern representation of this Abhidhamma view.  There may be a certain basis 
in the suttas for an absolute distinction between a singular and absolute truth, transcending speech and thought, on the one 
hand, and, on the other, all forms of ‘speech and thought’, even the ‘technical speech and thought’ of the Dhamma 
itself.  (Cf. the simile of the raft: MN 22 at M I 134-135; MN 38 at M I 260-261; cf. also, e.g., Sn 4.12 (Sn 172): ekañhi 
sacca	 na dutyamatthi, ‘The truth is one; there is no second.’)  But there is arguably no basis in the suttas for a relative 
distinction between an ‘absolute technical conceptual truth’ (the ‘real truth’ of the reductionist categories and concepts of 
the Abhidhamma) and ‘worldly, conventional truth’ (which by comparison becomes no ‘truth’ at all).
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conscious.  Therefore, there must be a fundamental distinction to be elucidated between asmi-mna
and the phenomenological import of the term aha	.
Another possible objection might be that this purely subjective sense of ‘I’ – as distinct from 
the ‘I am’ conceit – is somehow merely a natural by-product of the activity of mano, the ‘mental 
faculty’, sixth of the six sense faculties (indriyas).  This might seem plausible, since mano is de ned 
as the ‘refuge’ (paisaraa) of the  ve bodily senses: ‘Mano is (their) refuge, mano experiences their 
 eld and range.’73 In addition, mano experiences its own  eld and range of purely ‘mental’ or ‘ideal’ 
objects (dhammas).  Mano thus functions as the unifying synthesis of the six sense-consciousnesses 
constituting viñña-khandha.  Might not the sense of the ‘I’ be a mere by-product of this synthetic 
function of mano?
There are perhaps several reasons why this hypothesis cannot be sustained, but I need 
mention only one of these reasons here because, even by itself, it is as fundamentally decisive as it 
is simple and self-evident: namely, that the synthetic functions of mano would not even be possible
unless intentional subjectivity is already presupposed.  The functions of mano include, on the one 
hand, ‘simple’ acts of feeling, perception and conception; and, on the other, more ‘complex’ acts of 
cognitive synthesis (e.g., judgments such as ‘The proposition ‘All phenomena are impermanent’ is 
demonstrably true’).74  Both of these types of activities presuppose a mental structure of intentional 
subjectivity as their unifying principle: that structure cannot be derived from the acts themselves; 
rather, the acts are only possible if that structure is already in place.  Every kind of mental act 
(or noesis) has a de nite structure of intentional subjectivity directed towards its ‘objects’; and, 
in that sense, a noetic act also constitutes its ‘objects’ through speci c kinds of ‘object-meanings’ 
(noemas).  There is a strong correlation, here, with the function of manasikra,75 which may be 
73  SN 48.42 (at S V 218): mano paisaraa	, mano eva nesa	 gocaravisaya	 paccanubhoti.  (So also MN 43 (at M I 295).)
74  Such rational judgments must surely belong to the functions of mano.  Although they clearly presuppose an intuitive 
sense of ‘truth’, they are conceived and expressed linguistically and logically, and can thus be distinguished from purely 
intuitive and immediate recognitions of ‘truth’, which in EB are ascribed to ‘wisdom’ (paññ) and the ‘wisdom-eye’ 
(paññcakkhu).  Thus in MN 43 (at M I 293), it is asked, ‘What can be known by puri ed manoviñña, released from 
the  ve sense faculties?’ (‘nissahena… pañcahi indriyehi parisuddhena manoviññena ki	 neyyan’ti?).  The answer is 
the  rst three of the four higher meditative states (which the commentaries call arpni jhnni, ‘immaterial meditative 
states’).  Mano is implicitly contrasted to the wisdom-eye: ‘A dhamma that can be understood, friend, is (clearly) known 
by the wisdom-eye.  …Wisdom, friend, is for the purpose of direct knowledge, for the purpose of full knowledge, for 
the purpose of abandoning.’  (neyya	 kho, vuso, dhamma	 paññcakkhun pajnti …paññ kho, vuso, abhiññatth 
pariññatth pahnatth ti.)  I would argue that any ‘intuition of truth’ whatsoever – whether via mano or via paññcakkhu 
- is necessarily a mental act presupposing intentional subjectivity, and that no ‘intuition of truth’ (no ‘intuition’ of any 
kind at all) can occur independently of such a structure of subjectivity.  This, then, might also serve as a second argument 
against the hypothesis that the ‘I’ might be a by-product of manindriya; for, according to EB, ‘intuitions of truth’ can 
occur at a level of consciousness (e.g., the level of paññcakkhu) that is supposed to be beyond the scope of mano.
75  Literally, manasikaroti means ‘doing or making (karoti < k) in the mental faculty (manasi)’, and manasikra is 
an abstract neuter noun of action formed from the same root (manasi + kra < k).  It is often translated as ‘attention’, 
but I think that it (also) more strongly implies a sense of ‘intending towards’, and even, in some contexts, of ‘intentionally 
constituting’.  Thus, e.g., in the formulaic clause, sabbanimittna	 amanasikr animitta	 cetosamdhi	 upasampajja 
viharati (SN 41.7, at S IV 297), I think amanasikra is not mere ‘non-attention’, but implies a conscious meditative 
inhibition, withdrawal, or suspension of intentional functions (i.e., of intending towards ‘objects’, and of intentionally 
constituting ‘object-meanings’).  I do not believe that mere ‘non-attention’ would be suf cient for attaining an ‘objectless 
(‘non-noematic’) concentration of mind’, which the suttas identify as subsequent to the ‘sphere of neither perception 
nor non-perception’ (cf. MN 121, at M III 107-108), and thus second only to the ‘cessation of perception and feeling’. 
Indeed, this would explain why it is said (in the same passage) of a bhikkhu experiencing animitta cetosamdhi: so eva	 
pajnti: ‘ayampi kho animitto cetosamdhi abhisakhato abhisañcetayito’. ‘He (clearly) knows thus: ‘This objectless 
concentration of mind is [sc. intentionally] constituted and volitionally intended.’’  These matters are discussed in detail 
in other texts that I am currently in the process of writing.
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directed towards (or away from), and also constitute (or not constitute), its ‘objects’ and 
‘object-meanings’ or nimittas.76
At this point, it may be helpful to clarify further the ‘problems’ underlying the sense and 
usage of the term ‘I’.  An example from Wittgenstein may serve as a starting point.  Wittgenstein 
noticed what he called ‘two different cases in the use of the word ‘I’ (or ‘my’)’, which he called 
‘the use as object’ and ‘the use as subject’:77
Examples of the  rst kind of use are these: ‘My arm is broken’, ‘I have grown six inches’, 
‘I have a bump on my forehead’, ‘The wind blows my hair about’.  Examples of the second 
kind are: ‘I see so-and-so’, ‘I hear so-and-so’, ‘I try to lift my arm’, ‘I think it will rain’, 
‘I have a toothache’.78
Wittgenstein takes the ‘object sense’ of the word ‘I’ to refer to the body: that particular body 
that each of us calls ‘my body’, and which other people can also see, hear, and touch, for example. 
He goes on to say that this ‘object sense’ of ‘I’ is fallible: it is quite conceivable, for example, 
that I could, under some peculiar circumstance, visually mistake someone else’s arm for my own. 
In this way, he illustrates a distinction between the ‘object’ and the ‘subject’ sense of ‘I’.  For, 
it seems nonsensical to suppose that I could mistake a feeling of pain in my arm to be someone else’s
pain; or for someone to ask me, ‘Are you sure it’s you who feels the pain, and not someone else?’79 
But what does this distinction really imply?
Even though Wittgenstein says (correctly) that it is conceivable that I could mistake 
an objectively appearing part of someone else’s body as my own, one must point out that it 
would be just as nonsensical to doubt that it is I who see that body – whosesoever it might be, 
or even if it happens to be a hallucination – as it would be to doubt that it is I who feel a pain. 
Wittgenstein’s distinction is useful, but misleading, because it crosses unwittingly between three 
phenomenologically distinct categories: subjective consciousness-of; subjective or immanent 
phenomena (e.g., what I actually see, what I actually feel); and intersubjective ‘transcendent’ objects 
(e.g., my body and the bodies of others, as ‘objects’ in the ‘objective’ world).  But at least 
Wittgenstein was alert to a certain interesting distinction within the ordinary sense and function of 
76  In the context of EB, the term nimitta is usually translated as ‘sign’, and in some contexts as ‘ground’, ‘reason’ or 
‘cause’.  (Cf., e.g., Ñamoli and Bodhi 2009; Bodhi 2000; Ñamoli 1991.  Thanissaro translates as ‘impression’ or 
‘theme’, depending on context; cf., e.g., Thanissaro 2011, SN 8.4 (S I 188), SN 22.3 (at S III 10)  For a useful survey of its 
range of meaning, cf. Harvey 1986, §V, pp. 31-33.  Harvey (p. 33) concludes: ‘[Nimitta] is a delimited object of attention, 
that may, or should be taken as indicating something beyond itself or the general features of that to which it belongs.’). 
In my own work, the term nimitta has been correlated with the TP concept of noema (a correlation that requires a fairly 
detailed explanation and, no doubt, justi cation, which are provided elsewhere); that is why, for example, I sometimes 
refer to animitta cetosamdhi as an ‘‘objectless’ or ‘non-noematic’ concentration of mind’.
77  Bischof-Köhler points out (1991, p. 253, referring to W. James [1892] 1961, Psychology: The Briefer Course, Harper 
and Row, New York) that James had already written of this distinction in 1892, contrasting the sense of the ‘Me’, in 
which one experiences oneself as an ‘object’ (of experience), and the sense of the ‘I’, in which one experiences oneself as 
the ‘subject’ (of experience).
78  Wittgenstein 1958, pp. 66-67.  This distinction is phenomenologically valid and useful.  As we shall see, Husserl 
effectively makes just the same distinction, but from the perspective of TP, which differs in very important ways from 
Wittgenstein’s perspective upon and analysis of this distinction.
79  Cf. Wittgenstein 1958, p. 67.  Wittgenstein thinks of this distinction in terms of the rules of a ‘language-game’.  From 
a TP perspective, however, we must examine the ‘pre-linguistic’ aspects of subjectivity and intentionality, for which 
Wittgenstein’s ‘language-game’ theory cannot really account.  Furthermore, an interesting and phenomenologically 
important question is raised by the possibility of ‘knowing another’s mind’ (cf., e.g., SN 16.9, at S II 213).
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the word ‘I’: sometimes, we use it to refer to a particular body, namely, the one we think of as ‘our own’; 
and sometimes we use it to refer to our subjective consciousness-of whatever we are conscious-of.
Unlike the physical body, however, we cannot point to our subjective consciousness-of, 
or make it appear or manifest itself in any other way.  In this sense, by de nition, it is properly 
‘transcendental’: i.e., it is not anything phenomenal, something that could ‘appear’, whether to 
ourselves or to others.  What ‘appears’ is just what ‘manifests’ itself, what we are conscious-of 
as a ‘phenomenon’ in any of the modes of the ‘six sense spheres’ (sayatana) of consciousness 
(viñña).80  On the other hand, we also cannot doubt that we are subjectively conscious-of; so, this 
‘transcendental’ consciousness-of is something that we just know, immediately and apodictically, 
because, in any  nal analysis, when it comes to our own consciousness-of, what we know is just 
the fact that we know.  This is the one thing about which, in principle, no conscious being could 
possibly be mistaken.81  This, in effect, is the result of the epokh and of what Husserl calls 
the ‘transcendental reduction’.
Husserl says that the epokh and reduction lead us back to ‘absolute intentional 
consciousness’, and to the function of the ‘I’ as the pure subjectivity of that consciousness. 
He recognizes that this pure subjectivity is phenomenologically distinct from all that it is 
conscious-of: that includes, of course, the body, but also all sensations, thoughts, and emotions that 
appear as phenomena or experiences of that consciousness-of.  For this reason, he distinguishes 
between what he calls the ‘empirical I’ and this pure, transcendental subjectivity.  The ‘empirical I’ 
is that ‘objective’ or phenomenal ‘self’ constituted out of the appearances of ‘my own body’, 
‘my thoughts’, ‘my feelings’, and so on, which, as a complex psychophysical ‘entity’, belongs 
within, and is an inextricable part of, the ‘objective’ and intersubjective ‘world’.  We can see, then, 
that Husserl’s concept of the ‘empirical I’ is similar to Wittgenstein’s ‘object sense’ of the ‘I’, but 
it is much more inclusive: it includes all those phenomena, ‘physical’ or ‘mental’, which are taken 
to constitute the psychophysical person who lives and acts within, and as part of, the ‘world’. 
Of course, what Husserl has distinguished in this way is, in fact, the  ve clung-to aggregates 
(pañc-updna-kkhandh), which the ‘ordinary worldling’ (assutav puthujjana), the person in 
the ‘natural attitude’, assumes to be their ‘self’ (att).
Correlatively, Husserl also recognizes that the pure subjectivity of consciousness-of is 
utterly non-phenomenal: there is nothing about it that could possibly ‘appear’.  Therefore, it is not 
a ‘thing’, nor even remotely like any ‘thing’.  It is more like a ‘no-thing’, a ‘nothing’.  Indeed, it 
80  As is perhaps well known, in its Greek philosophical origins, the phainomenon is that which is caused to appear or 
which reveals itself (phainesthai) in the light (phaos); and this means, fundamentally, that which appears ‘in the light 
of the mind’.  (Cf., e.g., Heidegger 2001, ¶7, pp. 49-63 (1993, ¶7, pp. 27-39) for a thoughtful account.)  The common 
Indo-European root of these Greek terms is bh (cf., e.g., Hofmann 1994, pp. 464-465, 467), a root which appears also 
in Sanskrit and P
i (as both bh and bhs), with the same meaning: ‘to shine, be bright; shine forth, appear’, etc. 
(cf. Monier-Williams 1993, pp. 750.3-751.1, 755.3-756.1).  This root is evident in EB descriptions of citta, ‘mind’, as 
pabhassara, ‘brightly shining’ (e.g., pabhassara	 ida	 . . . citta	, AN i.49-52, at A I 10); and, still more importantly, in 
the descriptions of viñña anidassana, ‘non-manifestive consciousness’, as sabbato pabha	, ‘shining or luminous all 
round (in all directions)’ (D I 223; M II 329).  (For more details on pabhassara citta, cf. Harvey 1995, §§10.20-25, pp. 166-170, 
§§10.31-35, pp. 173-176; on viñña anidassana, cf. ibid., §§12.3ff., pp. 198ff.)
81  The signi cance of this result should be understood in the sense of Husserl’s TP, rather than in the incomplete and 
 awed sense of Descartes’ cogito.  For Husserl’s lucid and important exposition of why Descartes’ came so close, yet 
failed to recognize the true (properly phenomenological) meaning and implications of the cogito, cf. Husserl 1970b, 
§§17-18, pp. 75-81; Husserl 1954, §§17-18, pp. 76-83.
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really is like a kind of ‘emptiness’82 – except that it is evidently a consciousness-of, and therefore 
also a source of mental acts.  It is for this reason that Husserl calls it the transcendental or ‘pure I’ 
(das reine Ich).  In German orthography, the ordinary first-person pronoun ich is clearly 
distinguishable from the noun-form Ich; and Husserl virtually makes a technical term of the noun, 
das (reine) Ich, to name the fact of the pure subjectivity of consciousness-of.  But Husserl is aware 
of a dif culty here, when he writes:
The ‘I’ [das Ich] that I [ich] attain in the epokh . . . is actually called ‘I’ [„Ich“] only by 
equivocation – though it is an essential equivocation since, when I [ich] name it in re ection, 
I can say nothing other than: it is I [ich] who practice the epokh, I who interrogate, as 
phenomenon, the world. . .83
This ‘essential equivocation’ is in fact an essential indication pointing towards what is truly 
at the basis of the problem of the ‘I’.
On the one hand, pure subjectivity – which Husserl calls, by way of a certain inevitable 
equivocation, the ‘pure I’, also ‘the experiencing I’84 – apart from its nature as consciousness-of, 
and as a source of acts, ‘is completely empty of essence-components, has no explicable content, 
is undescribable in and for itself; it is pure ‘I’ and nothing more’.85  As pure, subjective consciousness-of, 
it is phenomenologically quite distinct from all phenomena of which it is conscious, including 
those constituting the ‘phenomenal person’ through which it ‘lives and experiences’ (erlebt).86  On 
the other hand, if it were somehow possible to sever the apparently inseparable unity of this 
subjective consciousness-of and the phenomena of which it is conscious, that consciousness-of would 
82  Cf., e.g., Husserl 1982, §80, p. 191; ibid., §57, pp. 132-133 (where he likens the phenomenological ‘I’ to 
‘a transcendental nothing [einem transzendentalen Nichts]’); Husserl 1980, §24, p. 110; ibid., §24, p. 111; Husserl 1970b, 
§43, p. 155; ibid., §55, p. 187.
83  Husserl 1970b, §54b, p. 184; Husserl 1954, §54, p. 188: ‘Das Ich, das ich in der Epoché erreiche . . . heißt eigentlich 
nur durch Äquivokation „Ich“, obschon es eine wesensmäßige Äquivokation ist, da, wenn ich es re ektierend benenne, 
ich nicht anders sagen kann als: ich bin es, ich der Epoché-Übende, ich, der die Welt . . . als Phänomen befrage. . .’.
84  Husserl 1976a, §80, p. 179: ‘das erlebende Ich’.
85  Husserl 1982, §80, p. 191 (translation modi ed); Husserl 1976a, §80, p. 179: ‘. . . ist es völlig leer an Wesenskomponenten, 
es hat gar keinen explikabeln Inhalt, es ist an und für sich unbeschrieblich: reines Ich und nichts weiter.’  Note that, in all 
quotations from English translations of Husserl, wherever the term ‘ego’ occurs in the translation, I have modi ed it to ‘I’ 
or ‘the ‘I’’, corresponding to ‘Ich’ and ‘das Ich’, wherever the latter occur in Husserl’s original German text.  The term 
‘ego’, which is of course just the  rst-personal pronoun in Latin and Greek (eg), in modern English connotes something 
‘objective’, rather than ‘subjective’; it does not really evoke a  rst-personal sense, as does the word ‘I’.  Moreover, 
the term ‘ego’ has attracted many connotations (e.g., from popular psychology and psychoanalysis) that are quite 
irrelevant to TP.
86  The transitive verb erleben means ‘to experience’, and is formed by the pre x er- (which has no meaning in itself) 
added to the intransitive verb leben, ‘to live’.  The connection between leben and erleben can be expressed in English: 
as when someone might say, ‘I know exactly what it was like: I lived it!’  Here, ‘lived’, of course, means ‘to experience 
directly, personally’.  The noun das Erlebnis, ‘experience’, formed by adding the suf x –nis (designating the result of 
an action) to the verb stem of erleben, becomes a technical term for Husserl.  He speci cally thematises the relationship 
between ‘pure consciousness’ (reines Bewußtsein) and its ‘pure correlates’ (reinen Bewußtseinskorrelaten) as a temporal 
process.  Thus, Kersten (Husserl 1982) has translated Erlebnis as ‘mental process’, while Cairns (Husserl 1970a) translates 
it as ‘subjective process’.  Husserl writes: ‘In itself, every mental process is a  ux of becoming . . .; it is a continuous 
 ow of retentions and protentions mediated by a  owing phase of originarity itself in which there is consciousness of 
the living now of the mental process in contradistinction to its ‘before’ and ‘after’.’  Husserl 1982, §78, p. 179.  (‘Jedes 
Erlebnis ist in sich selbst ein Fluß des Werdens . . .; ein beständinger Fluß von Retentionen und Protentionen vermittelt 
durch eine selbst  ießende Phase der Originarität, in der das lebendige Jetzt des Erlebnisses gegenüber seinem „Vorhin“ 
und „Nachher“ bewußt wird.’  Husserl 1976a, §78, p. 167.)
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lose all possible de nition; so, too, correlatively, would the phenomena, because a phenomenon is, 
by de nition, what appears to consciousness-of, in the way that it appears.  Thus, we would 
apparently end up with two virtual ‘nothingnesses’.
Even so, there would still be one fundamental difference here.  The phenomenon 
ultimately depends on consciousness-of for its appearance, although this does not mean that 
consciousness-of creates the phenomenon.  A phenomenon is, in effect, an essential aspect of 
an act of cognition; and that cognition may be of something that ‘transcends’ (‘extends beyond’) 
any momentary subjective act of consciousness-of: e.g., a ‘physical object’ in the intersubjective 
‘physical region’, or a ‘mathematical object’ in the ‘ideal region’.  Consciousness-of constitutes
the phenomenon precisely because the phenomenon is inseparable from the intentional act cognizing 
the ‘object’.87  But the phenomenon is not merely an image ‘representing’ an ‘object’ hidden behind 
it: rather, it is the direct but intentionally constituted cognition of the ‘object itself’.  In fact, it follows 
from this that the ‘object’ can have no ultimate, hidden, non-phenomenal ‘essence’ of its own: what 
the ‘object’ ‘is’ is only ever expressed through the modes of its appearances to consciousness-of.
By contrast, consciousness-of does not depend upon the phenomenon for its own intrinsic 
property of ‘being conscious’ or ‘being aware’.  It ought to be apodictically evident, in re ection, 
that the phenomena that appear to consciousness-of cannot be the cause of the consciousness-of 
that cognizes them.  On the other hand, one may certainly ask whether a consciousness-of deprived 
absolutely of all phenomenality would still be any kind of ‘consciousness-of’.
In the Mahnidna Sutta, the Buddha provides a neat refutation of the notion of ‘self’ (att) 
as relative to the experience of ‘feeling’ (vedan).  Three ways of regarding ‘self’ (atta-samanupassan) 
are de ned; but, for our purposes, we can legitimately reduce these down to two mutually exclusive 
ideas: (1) feeling is the self (the self is identical with feeling); (2) feeling is not the self (the self is 
separate from and independent of feeling).  The  rst notion is denied on the basis that all feeling is 
‘impermanent, constituted, dependently co-arisen, subject to destruction, decay, fading away, and 
cessation’.88  The conclusion is: ‘Therefore, here, because of this, it is not acceptable to consider: 
‘Feeling is my self’.’89  The second notion is denied by means of two expressions of the same 
argument, framed as rhetorical questions: ‘Where feeling altogether is not, could there be, there, 
(the thought) ‘I am’?’  Of course, the answer is: ‘Certainly not, Venerable Sir.’90  And again: ‘If all 
feeling were to cease completely in every way, without remainder, then with the complete non-being 
of feeling, because of the cessation of feeling, could there be, there, (the thought) ‘I am this’?’  Again, 
of course, the answer must be: ‘Certainly not, Venerable Sir.’91  These refutations of both (1) and (2) 
constitute an exhaustive dilemmatic refutation of a permanent, independently existing ‘self’ (att), 
given that ‘self’ cannot be identi ed with feeling, but nor can it be identi ed with anything other 
than feeling.  The Buddha concludes with the following deeply signi cant statement:
87  I have argued elsewhere that the expression ‘to constitute intentionally’, can be very closely correlated with concepts 
such as sakharoti and abhisakharoti in EB, especially when these are comprehended from a TP perspective.
88  DN 15 (at D II 66-67): . . . anicc sakhat paiccasamuppann khayadhamm vayadhamm virgadhamm 
nirodhadhamm.
89  DN 15 (at D II 67): tasmtiha . . . etena peta	 nakkhamati ‘vedan me att’ti samanupassitu	.
90  DN 15 (at D II 67): ‘yattha pana . . . sabbaso vedayita	 natthi api nu kho, tattha ‘asm’ti siy’ti?  ‘no heta	, bhante’.
91  DN 15 (at D II 67): ‘vedan ca hi . . . sabbena sabba	 sabbath sabba	 aparises nirujjheyyu	, sabbaso vedanya 
asati vedannirodh api nu kho tattha ‘ayamahamasm’ti siy’ti?  ‘no heta	, bhante’.
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[W]hen a bhikkhu does not consider feeling as self, and does not consider self as without 
experience of feeling, and does not consider ‘My self feels; for my self is subject to 
feeling’ – then, being without such considerations he does not cling to anything in the world. 
Not clinging, he is not agitated.  Not being agitated, he personally attains Nibbna.92
5.  The ‘I’ (aha) in meditation: a prolegomenon
The removal of the concept/conceit ‘I am’: that, verily, is the ultimate bliss!93
In the Vivekaja Sutta, Sriputta says to 	nanda: ‘I [aha	] entered and dwelt in the  rst 
jhna, which is accompanied by thought and examination, with rapture and happiness born of 
seclusion.  Yet, friend, it did not occur to me, “I am attaining the  rst jhna”, or “I have attained 
the  rst jhna”, or “I have emerged from the  rst jhna”’.  	nanda thinks: ‘It must be because 
I-making, mine-making, and the underlying tendency to conceit have been thoroughly uprooted in 
the Venerable Sriputta for a long time that such thoughts did not occur to him.’94
Once we recognize that the phenomenological sense of the term ‘I’ can, and must, be radically 
distinguished from constituted ontological senses such as ‘asm’ti, ‘ayam-aham-asm’ti, and att; 
and once we thereby also recognize that the phenomenological meaning of the term ‘I’ is grounded 
in the pre-linguistic intentionality of consciousness, and therefore cannot be dismissed as a mere 
linguistic convention; then, it becomes decidedly unproblematic to focus upon an inquiry into 
the question of the sense of the ‘I’ (aha	) in meditation.  For, what we are now focusing upon is 
the question of the intrinsic subjectivity of consciousness-of, an apodictic fact that is entirely 
unrelated to asmi-mna-anusaya, ahakra and mamakra, and thus does not in any sense 
con ict with the EB axiom of anatt.  These are recognitions that are most effectively accomplished 
in the transcendental attitude of the epokh or pahna; and, in particular, by means of the methods 
of re ection and meditation.  It is from within this perspective, and with the aid of these methods, 
that an inquiry into the ‘I’ of meditation really must proceed.
92  Bodhi 2010, p. 70.  DN 15 (at D II 68): yato kho . . . bhikkhu neva vedana	 attna	 samanupassati, nopi 
appaisa	vedana	 attna	 samanupassati, nopi ‘att me vediyati, vedandhammo hi me att’ti samanupassati. so eva	 
na samanupassanto na ca kiñci loke updiyati, anupdiya	 na paritassati, aparitassa	 paccattaññeva parinibbyati. . .
93  Ud 2.1 (Ud 10): asmimnassa yo vinayo, eta	 ve parama	 sukhanti.  This statement is uttered by the Buddha after 
his emergence from what seems to have been nirodha sampatti.  Cf. also AN 9.34 (A IV 414): ‘This Nibbna is blissful, 
friends.  This Nibbna is blissful, friends.  . . .  Just that, here, friends, is blissful: where the felt is not (where nothing is 
felt)!’  sukhamida	, vuso, nibbna	. sukhamida	, vuso, nibbna	  . . . etadeva khvettha, vuso, sukha	 yadettha 
natthi vedayita	.  Note that such ‘bliss’ is supposed to be ‘known’ or ‘experienced’ as a result of the erasure of the ‘I am’ 
conceit/concept and of the cessation of ‘the felt’ (vedayita).  Again, I must reiterate the irreducible principle that, where 
there is any ‘knowing’ or ‘experiencing’ of any kind at all, there is also (necessarily) ‘subjective consciousness-of’ (these 
being two aspects of one and the same fact).  On the other hand, however, the terms ‘subjectivity’ and ‘subject’ de nitely 
do not have the same meaning and implications.  (This point is further clari ed in the concluding Section §6 of the present 
paper.)
94  Bodhi 2000, p. 1015.  SN 28.1 (S III 235-236): ‘idhha	, vuso, vivicceva kmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi 
savitakka	 savicra	 vivekaja	 ptisukha	 pahama	 jhna	 upasampajja viharmi. tassa mayha	, vuso, na eva	 
hoti: ‘aha	 pahama	 jhna	 sampajjm’ti v ‘aha	 pahama	 jhna	 sampanno’ti v ‘aha	 paham jhn 
vuhito’ti v’ti. ‘tath hi panyasmato sriputtassa dgharatta	 ahakramamakramnnusay susamhat. tasm 
yasmato sriputtassa na eva	 hoti . . .’ti.
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The epokh or pahna, combined with re ective or meditative reduction, reveal (1) 
the apodicticity of awareness, (2) of intentionality, (3) of subjectivity, and (4) the intuitional nature 
of ‘truth’; they disclose (5) the true origin and meaning of the sense of ‘being’; (6) they awaken 
the phenomenological recognition that the ‘pure ‘I’’ and the pure ‘Now’ are really but two aspects 
of, or two ways of focusing upon, one and the same structure, thus opening up the problem of 
the relation between the ‘I’ and temporality in a radically potent and profound way; and they also 
disclose (7) the basis of the possibility of ‘volition’ and ‘agency’.  Within the limited space of this 
present paper, only the  rst three of these themes have been touched upon, all too brie y; the fourth 
has been referred to in passing; the  fth, sixth, and seventh themes are to be discussed in other 
writings.  However, a brief word, here, concerning the seventh theme might be useful for the present 
discussion.
Although I have not, so far, explicitly mentioned the question of agency, it is in a sense 
already implicit within the basic concept of the ‘mental act’; and in fact explicit in the capacity of 
intentional subjectivity to turn its intentional attention toward or away from its ‘objects’, and even 
to suspend its intentional attention from such ‘objects’.95  ‘Agency’, too, is a phenomenological
property of intentional consciousness; and just as subjectivity does not entail ‘a subject’, so, too, 
agency does not entail ‘an agent’.  Rather, agency is effective, just as subjectivity is effective, 
precisely because the intentionality of consciousness-of imbues the khandhas with experienced 
meaning, and thus makes their dependent co-arising possible.  If the khandhas lacked the unifying 
phenomenological ‘I’-sense, they could not intend and act; hence there could be no kamma; and 
therefore no paiccasamuppda and no punabbhava.  To put it in quite another way, the khandhas are 
not merely a mindless, robotic, deterministic componentry; if they were, enlightenment and liberation 
would be logically impossible, not to mention literally ‘meaningless’.  Rather, it is the constitutive 
experience of ‘meaning’ – which is another way of describing intentional consciousness – that makes 
craving (tah) and clinging (updna) possible, as it also makes possible dispassion (virga) and 
abandoning (pahna).  It also makes the fundamental contrast between binding ignorance (avijj) 
and liberating knowledge (ña) meaningful and consequential.
We should keep in mind that the doctrine of agency or action (kiriya, kriy) is fundamental 
to EB.96  One of  ve themes set down for frequent re ection by men and women, lay and ordained, 
is the following:
I am the owner of my actions, heir to my actions, born of my actions, related to my actions, 
taking refuge in my actions.  Whatever action I perform, good or evil, of that I shall be 
the inheritor.97
95  Cf., e.g., MN 121 (at M III 108): ‘And beyond that, again, 	nanda, a bhikkhu, by not intending in manas to 
the perception of the sphere of no-thing-ness, by not intending in manas to the perception of the sphere of neither 
perception nor non perception, intends in manas to the oneness (or essence) [ekatta	] dependent on the ‘objectless’ (or 
‘non-noematic’) concentration of mind.’  puna capara	, nanda, bhikkhu amanasikaritv kiñcaññyatanasañña	, 
amanasikaritv nevasaññnsaññyatanasañña	, animitta	 cetosamdhi	 paicca manasi karoti ekatta	.
96  Cf., e.g., AN 2.35 (A I 62), where the Buddha says: ‘I am one who teaches action (what ought to be done), brahmin, 
and non-action (what ought not to be done).’  ‘kiriyavd cha	, brhmaa, akiriyavd c’ti.  (Cf. also Vin III 2, D I 15, 
D I 132, M I 483, M II 167.)
97  AN 5.57 (at A III 72): ‘kammassakomhi, kammadydo kammayoni kammabandhu kammapaisarao. ya	 kamma	 
karissmi, kalya	 v ppaka	 v, tassa dydo bhavissm’ti. Cf. also AN 10.216 (A V 288); MN 135 (at M III 203).
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The agency of the ‘I’ is fundamental to Dhamma practice and to the path to liberation. 
It begins with self-re ection upon and self-disciplining of one’s own mind: ‘A monk himself should 
re ect upon himself thus. . .’;98 ‘Constantly one’s own mind should be re ected upon. . .’.99  For 
an especially unruly mind in meditation, the following example is given: ‘He beats down, constrains 
and crushes mind with mind.’100  In brief: ‘A bhikkhu wields mastery over his mind, he does not let 
the mind wield mastery over him.’101
These descriptions are all in the third person, but one need only transpose them into one’s 
own subjective practice in order to con rm their  rst-personal phenomenological sense.  That sense 
is quite explicit in other examples, which are expressed  rst-personally: e.g., it is said that one 
who, through the arising of vision (cakkhuppda), abandons desire and lust for the pañc-updna-
kkhandh, might think: ‘For a long time, alas, I [aha	] have been deceived, cheated and seduced 
by this mind [citta].’102  It should hopefully be clear by now why such a use of the term ‘I’ (aha	) 
is phenomenologically meaningful and important, why it cannot be ‘reduced’ to a meaningless 
linguistic marker or to a mere congregation of atomic components, and why it is doctrinally quite 
unproblematic because it does not contradict the anatt axiom.  To the contrary, the sense of ‘I’ is 
inseparable from the acts of insight and volition without which the path to liberation could not be 
practised. As we have seen,103 ‘abandoning’ (pahna) is itself a foundational act of the path; and 
this very act of abandoning is itself an act of decision and will motivated by understanding.  When 
the Buddha admonishes the abandoning of the  ve aggregates because these are ‘not yours’, 
the question ‘Who abandons the  ve aggregates?’ would be ill-formed and ultimately meaningless;104
but the question ‘How can the aggregates be abandoned?’ would be quite meaningful, and may be 
understood, and practised, precisely through the recognition that neither the subjectivity nor 
the agency of intentional consciousness, nor intentional consciousness itself, constitute a ‘self’. 
Thus, ‘abandoning the All’ is no paradox at all.
The Buddha himself, of course, uses the term aha	 to refer to his subjective 
‘consciousness-of’.  That he is indeed subjectively conscious and that his experience is intentionally 
constituted is necessarily demonstrated every time he hears and understands others who address 
him and every time he addresses others.  It is necessarily evident every time he picks up his outer 
robe and his alms-bowl and goes to the village on his alms-round;105 or when he surveys the sagha
98  E.g., MN 15 (at M I 98): bhikkhun attanva attna	 eva	 paccavekkhitabba	. . .  The syntax of the P
i could be 
rendered more literally: ‘by a monk himself the self should be re ected upon thus. . .’, which of course does not imply 
that the monk has a ‘self’ (att), but that he re ects upon ‘his own mind and body’.
99  SN 22.100 (at S III 151): abhikkhaa	 saka	 citta	 paccavekkhitabba	. . .
100  Ñamoli and Bodhi 2009, §7,  p. 213.  M 20 (at M i.121): . . . cetas citta	 abhiniggahato abhinippayato 
abhisantpayato. . .
101  Ñamoli and Bodhi 2009, §9, p. 310.  MN 32 (at M I 214): bhikkhu citta	 vasa	 vatteti, no ca bhikkhu cittassa 
vasena vattati.  Cf. also AN 7.40 (A IV 34).
102  MN 75 (at M I 511): ‘dgharatta	 vata . . . aha	 imin cittena nikato vañcito paluddho. . .’
103  Cf. section 2.1 above.
104  Cf. SN 12.35 (at S II 60): ‘A certain monk said this to the Blessed One: “. . . For whom is there this aging and death?” 
“Not a valid question”, the blessed one replied.’  aññataro bhikkhu bhagavanta	 etadavoca: ‘. . .kassa ca panida	 
jarmaraan’ti?  ‘no kallo pañho’ti bhagav avoca.  Similarly, SN 12.12 (at S II 13): ‘“Who, then, Venerable Sir, feeds 
on consciousness-food?”  “Not a valid question”, the Blessed One replied.’  ‘ko nu kho, bhante, viññhra	 hret’ti? 
‘no kallo pañho’ti bhagav avoca.
105  E.g., MN 18 (at M I 109): atha kho bhagav pubbahasamaya	 nivsetv pattacvaramdya kapilavatthu	 
piya pvisi.
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silently meditating and is pleased with the progress of the monks.106  But perhaps the most striking 
example is the Buddha’s  rst-person description of his attainment of the three knowledges 
(tisso vijj) on the night of his enlightenment and liberation.107  Attaining the  rst knowledge, he says: 
‘I remembered my various previous abodes [i.e., lives]. . .’108  This knowledge raises the question, 
from the  rst-personal perspective, of the relation between the ‘I’ and the temporal continuity of 
subjective experience, both within and between different lifetimes.  Attaining the second knowledge, 
he says: ‘With the divine eye, which is pure and transcends the human, I saw beings passing away and 
reappearing . . . and I understood that beings proceed [sc. after death] according to their actions.’109
This knowledge again raises the previous question, but from a third-personal perspective, and imbued 
with the recognition of the constitutive power and ethical value of subjective volitional intent and 
action.  Finally, by attaining the third and ultimate knowledge, he automatically attained liberation: 
‘I recognised directly, just as it actually is: ‘These are the unconscious in uences [sav]’ . . . ‘This 
is the arising of the unconscious in uences’ . . . ‘This is the cessation of the unconscious in uences’ . . . 
‘This is the path leading to the cessation of the unconscious in uences’.  Then, knowing thus, seeing 
thus, my mind was liberated [sc. from the ‘unconscious in uences’]. . .’110
From this moment on, Gotama was enlightened and liberated; with the extinction of 
the savas, the sense of ‘asm’ti also forever vanished.  It is important to recognise that ‘liberation’, 
here, is not merely an external ‘result’ of the ‘third knowledge’, but is ultimately identical with it: 
the direct recognition and understanding of the ‘unconscious in uences’ is itself the liberation from 
them.111  This liberation itself is also an act of knowledge: ‘When liberated, there was the knowledge: 
‘Liberated’.’112 Here, then, in the Buddha’s description of the crucial act of ‘knowing’ that is 
the essential  nal goal of EB, we cannot but recognise the evident irreducibility of intentional 
subjectivity.  Where there is ‘knowledge’ there is certainly an ‘act of knowing’: there is certainly 
a subjective consciousness-of, even though there is no ‘self’, no ‘subject’, no sense of ‘I am’ or ‘I 
am this’.
106  E.g., MN 118 (at M II 79): atha kho bhagav tuhbhta	 tuhbhta	 bhikkhusagha	 anuviloketv bhikkh 
mantesi: ‘raddhosmi, bhikkhave, imya paipadya; raddhacittosmi, bhikkhave, imya paipadya. . .’
107  MN 4 (at M I 22-23).
108  MN 4 (at M I 21-22): so kho aha	 . . . pahama	 jhna	 upasampajja vihsi	 . . . catuttha	 jhna	 upasampajja 
vihsi	 . . . so eva	 samhite citte parisuddhe pariyodte . . . pubbenivsnussatiñya citta	 abhininnmesi	.  so 
anekavihita	 pubbenivsa	 anussarmi.  (I have begun this elliptical quotation of the P
i text with the  rst words of 
the Buddha‘s extended report, where the pronoun aha	 occurs.)
109  MN 4 (at M I 22): so dibbena cakkhun visuddhena atikkantamnusakena satte passmi cavamne upapajjamne 
hne pate suvae dubbae sugate duggate yathkammpage satte pajnmi . . .
110  MN 4 (at M I 23): ‘ime sav’ti yathbhta	 abbhaññsi	, ‘aya	 savasamudayo’ti yathbhta	 abbhaññsi	, 
‘aya	 savanirodho’ti yathbhta	 abbhaññsi	, ‘aya	 savanirodhagmin paipad’ti yathbhta	 abbhaññsi	. 
tassa me eva	 jnato eva	 passato . . . citta	 vimuccittha. . .
111  The formula expressing the direct recognition of the savas is of course identical with the formula expressing 
the direct recognition of the ‘Four Noble Truths’ (but cf. Harvey 2009); thus MN 4 (at M I 23): so ‘ida	 dukkhan’ti 
yathbhta	 abbhaññsi	, ‘aya	 dukkhasamudayo’ti yathbhta	 abbhaññsi	, ‘aya	 dukkhanirodho’ti yathbhta	 
abbhaññsi	, ‘aya	 dukkhanirodhagmin paipad’ti yathbhta	 abbhaññsi	.
112  MN 4 (at M I 23): vimuttasmi	 vimuttamiti ña	 ahosi.  (Cf. also fn. 66 above.)
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6. Conclusion: Not ‘thing’, but ‘quality’; not ‘the pure ‘I’’, but 
just pure ‘‘I’-ness’
My point of conclusion, then, will be to propose a decisive terminological shift.  Throughout 
this discussion, I have never made philosophical use of the term ‘subject’, but only of the term 
‘subjectivity’.  The distinction between these two terms is perhaps self-explanatory, precisely 
because their two senses (especially in the present context) are so radically different.  Although 
they are both nouns, they belong to fundamentally different categories: the former readily suggests 
the notion of an ‘independently-existing individual being’, a kind of ‘thing’ or ‘entity’, and so can 
readily tend towards the concept of att.  The latter, however, can only really mean a property 
or quality of consciousness, and so can be readily dissociated, conceptually, from any notion of 
a ‘subject’ as an ‘independently-existing individual being’.  ‘Subjectivity’ can belong to 
‘consciousness-of’ without having to belong to ‘a subject’, as such; in fact, ‘subjectivity’ is 
virtually synonymous with the very sense of ‘consciousness-of’.  What has already been discussed 
so far should hopefully make this point evident.
Perhaps it is also already clear that Husserl’s use of the noun-term ‘I’ (Ich), i.e., 
‘the pure ‘I’’ (das reine Ich), ‘the transcendental ‘I’’ (das transzendentale Ich), is problematic.  If one 
understands what Husserl is referring to as the ‘residuum’ of the epokh and of the transcendental 
reduction, then one also understands the reason why Husserl says, quite rightly, that this use of 
the term ‘I’ is really ‘an essential equivocation’.113  But the equivocation can easily be avoided. 
Just as the word ‘subjectivity’ arguably indicates the actual nature of ‘consciousness-of’, whereas 
the word ‘subject’ obscures and even deforms it, so too, a term such as ‘‘I’-ness’, which would name 
a quality or property of consciousness, would be preferable to the term ‘the ‘I’’, which can easily 
be misunderstood and rei ed, once again, into the notion of an ‘independent entity’.  In effect, I am 
suggesting that ‘‘I’-ness’ is ultimately a synonym for ‘subjectivity’;114 and that this is, after all, 
the necessary TP meaning of Husserl’s term, ‘the pure ‘I’’.  Looking at the matter in this way perhaps 
helps to clarify why that which Husserl called ‘the pure ‘I’’ was necessarily a kind of ‘emptiness’. 
After all, he himself recognised that what he called ‘the ‘I’’ was no kind of ‘positive entity’.115  If 
we see that ‘the ‘I’’ is in fact just the ‘‘I’-ness’ – the pure subjectivity – of consciousness-of, then 
its ‘emptiness’ is not surprising, but quite natural.  It is an apodictically knowable property of 
an apodictically knowable transcendental: namely, the consciousness-of consciousness-of.
The  rst-personal pronoun, ‘I’, ‘aha	’, is thus not an empty, non-referring linguistic 
marker used merely according to worldly convention; but nor does it refer to some permanent, 
independently-existing entity.  This term has not only a ‘use’, but a genuine ‘meaning’: the intrinsic 
113  Cf. fn. 83, and its main text, above.
114  However, the term ‘‘I’-ness’ expresses something that the term ‘subjectivity’ may not express so clearly or vividly; 
for, the latter term is somewhat conceptual and theoretical, whereas the former term evokes the same property of 
consciousness in a more directly experiential (‘ rst-personal’) sense; a more robustly phenomenological sense.
115  Cf., e.g., Husserl 1980, §24, p. 111: ‘Everything which ‘appears’, everything which, in whatever way, presents and 
manifests itself can also not be; I can be deceived by these things.  The ‘I’, however, does not appear, does not present 
itself merely from a side, does not manifest itself merely according to discrete determinations, aspects, and moments. 
. .  As pure ‘I’ it does not harbor any hidden inner richness; it is absolutely simple and it lies there absolutely clear.’ 
(‘Alles „Erscheinende“, alles irgendwie sich Darstellende, Bekundende kann auch nicht sein, und ich kann mich darüber 
täuschen.  Das Ich aber erscheint nicht, stellt sich nicht bloß einseitig dar, bekundet sich nicht bloß nach einzelnen 
Bestimmtheiten, Seiten, Momenten. . .  Als reines Ich birgt es keine verborgenen inneren Reichtümer, es ist absolut 
einfach, liegt absolut zutage. . .’  (Husserl 1952a, §24, pp. 104-105.))  Cf. also fn. 82 above for further referen ces.
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and irreducible pure subjectivity – the ‘‘I’-ness’ – of intentional consciousness.  If there were 
no intentional consciousness, with its inherent property of pure subjectivity, not only would 
the pronoun ‘I’, ‘aha	’, have no meaning: it could not exist.  Yet, it does exist, and the Buddha 
had no qualms about using it in the same breath with which he preached the principle of anatt, 
because he understood, much more deeply than we, its true meaning and nature.  Indeed, without 
that meaning, there would be no ‘path’ (magga) and no ‘escape’ (nissaraa).116  If we confuse 
and con ate the root error of ‘aham-asm’ti with the true but hidden meaning of ‘aha	’ – namely, 
the intrinsic ‘‘I’-ness’ of consciousness-of – then I believe that we lose sight of the genuine 
possibility of the path and the gateway of escape.
By you the effort must be made.  The Tathgatas are (but) teachers.117
116  MN 7 (at M I 39): ‘there is an escape beyond this whole realm of perception.’  atthi imassa saññgatassa uttari	 
nissaraa	.
117  Dhp 20, §276a (at Dhp 40): tumhehi kiccamtappa	 akkhtro tathgat.
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